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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-CALIFORNIA'S
GENDER BASED STATUTORY RAPE LAW UPHELD. Michaelif. v. Su-
perior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
The defendant, Michael, and two friends approached two sis-
ters at a bus stop one midnight. Michael, then seventeen and one-
half years old, and Sharon, sixteen years old, wandered away from
the group and began to kiss.' After being struck in the face for re-
buffing Michael's advances, Sharon submitted to sexual inter-
course. 2 As a result, Michael was convicted of statutory rape under
the California Penal Code.? Prior to trial, the defendant sought to
have the charge dismissed on state4 and federal5 constitutional
grounds, asserting that California's statutory rape law unlawfully
discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court and the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals denied the request for relief. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court found a compelling state interest in preventing
illegitimate teenage pregnancies and upheld the statute.6 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. MichaelM v.
Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution guarantees that
similarly situated people will be dealt with in a similar manner by
1. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun said that the factors involved in this
case, particularly the victim's initial willing participation, "should make this case an unat-
tractive one to prosecute at all, and especially to prosecute as a felony, rather than as a
misdemeanor chargeable under § 261.5. But the State has chosen to prosecute in that man-
ner, and the facts, I reluctantly conclude, may fit the crime." 450 U.S. 464, 484-87 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
2. For a partial transcript of the preliminary hearing, see 450 U.S. at 483-88 n.*
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
3. Section 261.5 of the code defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is
under the age of 18 years." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West Supp. 1981).
4. The petitioner challenged the statute as a denial of equal protection. CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 21 provides, "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may
not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of
citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens."
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
6. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340
(1979).
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the government. At least one authority views this guarantee, which
governs all governmental actions classifying individuals for different
benefits or burdens under the law, as the single most important con-
cept in the Constitution for the protection of individual rights.8
The Supreme Court has enunciated several forms of analysis in
cases involving equal protection challenges.9 The "rational basis
test" is a broad standard that requires the state to have merely a
"rational basis" for its statutory classification.'0  Under the rational
basis test, the Court looks at the stated purpose of a statute and
presumes that it is valid and constitutional,"' and the burden of
proving the contrary is placed on the party challenging the statute. ' 2
The Court looks first at whether the statute is reasonable 3 and looks
then at the classification effected by the statute.' 4 If the scope of the
statute bears a rational relationship to the stated purpose of the stat-
ute, the statute is constitutional."5 Equal protection challenges based
on sex discrimination have consistently failed under the rational ba-
sis test, 6 and gender-based statutory rape statutes have been con-
sistently upheld.' 7
A second standard commonly used by the Court is the strict
7. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NOWAK].
8. Id. at 517.
9. Eg., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
10. Weidner, The Equal Protection Clause: The Continuing Search for Judicial Stan-
dards, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 867, 867 (1980); e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
11. E.g, McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-09 (1969).
12. E.g., Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973); Madden
v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
13. Eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
14. The classification may be over-inclusive in that it treats in a similar manner persons
who have similar characteristics and some additional persons who do not share the legiti-
mately distinguishing characteristic. The statute may also be under-inclusive in that it in-
cludes a small number of persons who fit the purpose of the statute but excludes some who
are similarly situated. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 521 (1978). Compare Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (challenged as under-inclusive), with Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (challenged as over-inclusive).
15. Eg., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971).
16. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-63 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464,
465-66 (1948); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417-23 (1908).
17. Eg., Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); People v. Mackey, 46 Cal.
App. 3d 755, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1976); In re W.E.P., 318 A.2d 286 (D.C. 1974); State v.
Elmore, 24 Or. App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976); Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 230 N.W.2d
637 (1975).
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scrutiny test.'8 As the name implies, this standard is more stringent
than the rational basis test and places a heavy burden on the state to
justify a challenged law or regulation. 9 The Court looks at the ac-
tual purpose or effect of the statute. The strict scrutiny test is ordi-
narily used with suspect classifications20 that are presumed invalid 2'
and are upheld only if there is an extraordinary justification.22 The
United States Supreme Court does not consider sex a suspect classi-
fication.23 The California Supreme Court, however, does consider
sex a suspect classification and uses strict scrutiny in cases involving
gender-based classifications.24
In Reed v. Reed25 the Court enunciated a third standard of re-
view when it invalidated a statute which discriminated on the basis
of sex.26 The test used by the Court established a middle-tier level
18. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Korematsu v. United States
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See generally Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another
Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 807, 812 (1973).
19. Eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633-38 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
20. The phrase "suspect classification" was first used by Justice Black in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), when he said, "It should be noted, to begin with, that all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately sus-
pect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216.
Classifications that have been labeled suspect by the Supreme Court include those
based on race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); and national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46
(1948). The United States Supreme Court does not, however, consider sex a suspect classifi-
cation. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
21. Eg., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
22. E.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. Eg., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973), in which the Court, in a plurality
opinion, characterized gender classifications as inherently suspect.
24. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 610, 601 P.2d 572, 574, 159 Cal. Rptr.
340, 342 (1979); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17-18, 485 P.2d 529, 539-40, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 329, 339-40 (1971). In Sail'er Inn, the California court considered the constitutionality
of a California law prohibiting women from tending bar unless they or their husbands held a
liquor license. The court declared that classifications based on sex should be treated as
suspect and struck down the law as violative of the state and federal constitutions. 5 Cal. 3d
at 17, 485 P.2d at 538, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 339. For a suggestion that the California court did
not use strict scrutiny in Michael M, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape
Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 784-86 (1980).
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The case involved a mandatory provision of the Idaho Probate
Code that gave preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class
applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. The plaintiff in Reed was
the mother of a deceased minor. She sought appointment as administrator but, instead, the
court appointed the minor's father, even though he filed his petition seeking the appoint-
ment after the mother filed hers.
26. Id. at 77. See Weidner, supra note 10, at 881.
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:315
of scrutiny. It required a classification to have a "fair and substan-
tial relationship" to the "object of the legislation."27 Reed was con-
sidered a turning point for gender-based equal protection
challenges.28
Middle-tier scrutiny was further developed in Craig v. Boren,2 9
in which a two-part test was formulated. To withstand constitu-
tional challenge under Craig, a gender-based classification must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives. 30 Under Craig the actual
rather than the stated purpose of the statute is studied.31 There is no
presumption either for or against the validity of the classification,32
and the burden of proof is on those defending the statute to justify
the discrimination. 3 To justify such a classification, the state must
show an important and articulated purpose for its use. 34 Statistical
evidence,35 administrative convenience,36 or the mere assertion by
the state that a difference exists between men and women in a par-
ticular area 37 have all been held insufficient to meet this burden.
Seven equal protection cases involving gender discrimination
were decided by the United States Supreme Court between 1976
and 1979.38 Of the seven, four statutory schemes were invalidated3 9
27. 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
28. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also Survey, Equal Protection Challenges to Statutory
Rape Law, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1088, 1090 (1981); Comment, Unlawful Sexual Inter-
course.- Old Notions and .4 Suggested Reform, 12 PAC. L.J. 217, 221 (1980); Note, New
Hampshire Statutory Rape Provision, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 320, 323-24 (1978).
29. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The case involved a challenge to an Oklahoma statute making
it unlawful to sell liquor to a minor. For purposes of the statute, a minor was defined as a
female under 18 and a male under 21.
Craig was the first Supreme Court case involving gender based classifications in a crim-
inal statute. Comment, supra note 24, at 789. When a criminal statute is involved, a "spe-
cial sensitivity" to the classification is merited. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S 184, 192
(1964); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 604 (lst Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950
(1978); see also Note, supra note 28, at 323.
30. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1971).
31. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199, 212-13 (1977). "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an
automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a
statutory scheme." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
32. Survey, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 186-88 (1977).
33. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197; Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142,
151 (1980).
34. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978).
35. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 204.
36. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980).
37. Id. at 151.
38. Weidner, supra note 10, at 888.
39. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (benefits provided to families deprived of
1982] NOTES 319
and three were upheld4" using the Craig middle-tier standard. None
of these cases specifically involved gender-based statutory rape laws.
In lower federal courts, however, four cases challenging gender-
based statutory rape laws have been heard in recent years. The
courts invalidated three of the statutes under the Craig middle-tier
scrutiny.4'
The defendants in the four cases contended that the statutes
violated their constitutional guarantee of equal protection because
they punished only males. The government in the four cases con-
tended that the statutes were valid because they protected legitimate
state interests in preventing unwanted pregnancies and protecting
minor females from physical and emotional harm. In United States
Y. Hicks42 the defendant was convicted of violating two federal stat-
utes43 that punished males who had carnal knowledge of underaged
females; the twenty-five year old defendant in Navedo v. Preisser
44
was convicted under Iowa law for having sexual intercourse with a
sixteen year old female;45 and the defendant in Meloon v.
Helgemoe46 was convicted under a New Hampshire rape statute
which prohibited sexual intercourse with a nonspouse female under
fifteen years of age.47 All three statutes were invalidated on equal
protection grounds.48 The courts placed the burden on the govern-
ment to produce evidence that would justify the statutes49 and to
support because of the father's unemployment); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(only unwed mothers allowed to block adoption); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (alimony
duty imposed on men only); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (women presumed
dependent on husbands for Social Security survivor's benefits).
40. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (Massachusetts veteran's preference
statute); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (statute prevented unwed father who has
not legitimated a child from suing for the wrongful death of the child); Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (1977) (Social Security formula provided higher retirement payments to wo-
men than to men).
41. Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980) (IowA CODE ANN. § 698.1 (West
1946) (repealed 1977) invalidated); United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980) (18
U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2032 (1976) invalidated); Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979)
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964) (repealed 1976) upheld); Meloon v. Helgemoe,
564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632:1(I)(c) (1974) (repealed 1975) invalidated).
42. 625 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1980).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2032 (1976).
44. 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980).
45. IOWA CODE ANN. § 698.1 (West 1946) (repealed 1977).
46. 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978).
47. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632:1(I)(c) (1974) (repealed 1975).
48. Navedo, 630 F.2d at 637; Hicks, 625 F.2d at 217; Meloon, 564 F.2d at 603.
49. Navedo, 630 F.2d at 640; Hicks, 625 F.2d at 219; Meloon, 564 F.2d at 606. The
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:315
show how the gender-based classification substantially furthered the
statutes' objectives."0 The courts found that the government failed
to meet that burden.5 ' A similar classification was upheld, however,
in Rundlet v. Oliver,52 in which the defendant was the junior high
school teacher of the complaining witness when he engaged in sex-
ual intercourse with her.5 3 The court found that the classification
embodied in the statute54 was substantially related to the achieve-
ment of the governmental objective of preventing physical injury to
a female under fourteen years of age. 55
The state interest in specially protecting young females has
been held valid by a majority of courts because women are more
susceptible than men to such harms as pregnancy, 56 physical in-
jury,57 and emotional injury.58 Following this rationale, courts have
uniformly upheld the constitutionality of statutory rape59 as a
court in Meloon found the state's interest in preventing pregnancy and physical injury to
young girls did not comport with the New Hampshire law which defined sexual intercourse
as "any penetration, however slight; emission not required." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 632: l(I)(c) (1974) (repealed 1975). The court required a positive showing that the objective
of the statute in question was to prevent pregnancy. 564 F.2d at 607-08.
50. Navedo, 630 F.2d at 641. ("The state, however, has offered no evidence of any
kind-legislative history, statistical, or medical-to support these arguments." Id. at 639);
Hicks, 625 F.2d at 219 ("The government had the burden of showing why gender is a 'suffi-
ciently "accurate proxy"' for prevention of harm arising from contact which inherently re-
quires the participation of both sexes." Id. at 220 (citations omitted)); Aeloon, 564 F.2d at
607 (Pregnancy is a fundamental characteristic distinguishing the two sexes and can be used
as an "available hindsight catchall rationalization" for almost any gender-based legislation;
moreover, statutory rape legislation traditionally has included very young females for whom
pregnancy is no threat.).
51. Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636, 640-41 (1980); United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d
216, 220 (1980); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 606 (1977).
52. 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979).
53. Id. at 496. "Although Rundlett was expressly tried on the theory that consent was
not an issue or a defense, the circumstances of the parties' sexual relationship may have
influenced the court's analysis." Comment, supra note 24, at 793. The dissent made a simi-
lar assertion. 607 F.2d at 505 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
54. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964) (repealed 1976).
55. 607 F.2d at 502. The court pointed out, however, that it doubted the acceptability of
a pregnancy prevention rationale for a gender-based statute. The court found that the
Maine Supreme Court's conclusions about the legislative history of the pregnancy preven-
tion rationale were not based on the statutory language but upon "after-the-fact information
drawn from failures to act on the part of the Maine legislature." Id. at 502 n. 15.
56. E.g., Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1976); Acosta v. State, 417 A.2d 373
(Del. 1980).
57. E.g., Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 260 S.E.2d 40 (1979); State v. Wilson, 296 N.C.
298, 250 S.E.2d 621 (1979).
58. See Hall v. State, 365 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d
1253 (Ala. 1979).
59. The earliest codified laws making rape a crime were contained in the Code of Ham-
murabi, dating about 1700 B.C. "If a man has forced the wife of another man, who has not
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crime.60 Historically males have always been the culpable parties,
and the protection of the male's property interest in the female 6' has
been the underlying purpose of the law. California's statutory rape
law62 has a similar historical justification.63
Although California has not amended its statute,64 in the last
few years more than half of the states have substantially revised
their rape laws. 65 The most significant changes in the statutory rape
laws have been the elimination of traditional gender-based classifi-
cations of the parties involved 66 and the gradations of the offense so
that the severity of punishment varies with the conduct or relative
ages of the parties.67 To date, at least thirty-nine states have passed
gender-neutral statutory rape laws. 68 It was in this climate of statu-
known the male, and who still resides in the house of her father, and has lain within her
breasts, and he is found, that man shall be slain; that woman is guiltless." CODE OF HAM-
MURABI § 130 (C. Edwards trans. 1971). See generally Smith, History of Rape and Rape
Laws, 60 WOMEN L.J. 188, 188-89 (1974); Comment, supra note 24, at 762; Comment, Rape
Laws, Equal Protection, and Privacy Rights, 54 TUL. L. REV. 456, 464-69 (1980).
60. E.g., Olson v. State, 95 Nev. 1,588 P.2d 1018 (1979); People v. Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d
457, 415 N.E.2d 927, 434 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1980); State v. Elmore, 24 Or. App. 651, 546 P.2d
1117 (1976).
61. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919,
924 (1973). It may be argued that statutory rape laws serve only to preserve the "market
value" of virginal young women as potential brides, rather than to protect them from sexual
exploitation. Id. at 925. This contention is supported by the fact that consent is not a de-
fense to statutory rape. Id.
62. California's statutory rape law was part of California's first penal code in 1850.
1850 Cal. Stats., ch. 99, § 47, at 234. Since 1913 the age of consent has been fixed at 18. See
MichaelM, 450 U.S. at 494-95 n.9; MichaelM, 25 Cal. 3d at 618, 601 P.2d at 578, 159 Cal.
Rptr. at 346 (Mosk, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 24, at 762 n.39.
63. "Because females generally have not reached puberty by the age of 10, it is incon-
ceivable that a statute designed to prevent pregnancy would be directed at acts of sexual
intercourse with females under that age." Michael M, 450 U.S. at 495 n.9 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
64. The California Legislature considered and rejected proposals to render section 261.5
gender-neutral. Michael M, 450 U.S. at 471 n.6.
65. Comment, supra note 24, at 765 (quoting Note, Rape I1, 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L.
REP. 90, 136 (1977)).
66. "Where, as here, the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well
served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries
with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the
basis of sex." Off v. Onf, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); see also MichaelM, 450 U.S. at 491-92
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (A state cannot meet its burden without showing that a gender-
neutral statute would be a less effective means of achieving that goal.).
67. Comment, supra note 24, at 764-66.
68. Eg., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803(1)(c) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (4)
(West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.030(3), .050 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1982); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-3703(3)(B)(4), 39-3711 (Cum. Supp. 1981). For a fist of 39 states with
gender-neutral statutory rape provisions see, Comment, supra note 24, at 765 n.50, and Note,
Gender-Based Statutory Rape Provision Held Invalid, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 310, 311 n.9 (1981).
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tory reform that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
to Michael M.
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,69 the Court
found that California's statutory rape law did not violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Cour vpointed
out that gender-based classifications have not been labeled inher-
ently suspect by the United States Supreme Court, and, therefore,
they are not subject to strict scrutiny.70 The Court traced the devel-
opment of the standard set forth in Craig v. Boren7 that requires the
classification to bear a "substantial relationship" to "important gov-
ernmental objectives. '7 2 The Court then applied a version of the
Craig test, substituting the word "sufficient" for "substantial," and
held that the "statute is sufficiently related to the State's objectives
to pass constitutional muster. ' 73 The Court said that it has consist-
ently upheld statutes if the gender classification "realistically reflects
the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated. '74
The Court found that the purpose (governmental objective) of
the statute is to discourage illicit sexual intercourse with a minor
female and thus to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies, a mat-
ter in which the state has a strong interest.75 Since only women be-
come pregnant, the Court found they are not situated similarly to
men with respect to the risks of sexual intercourse and, in fact, suffer
the consequences disproportionately to men.76 Therefore, the legis-
lature may appropriately punish only the male.77 According to the
Court, "[T]he risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deter-
rence to young females.' ' 78 By placing a criminal sanction on males,
the deterrents are equalized.79
69. Joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell. Separate opin-
ions were written by Justice Stewart (concurring), Justice Blackmun (concurring), and Jus-
tice Stevens (dissenting).
70. 450 U.S. at 468.
71. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
72. 450 U.S. at 469.
73. Id. at 472-73.
74. Id. at 469.
75. Id. at 470. In support of its finding of a legitimate state interest, the Court cited
statistical evidence on teenage pregnancies, maternal death in teenagers, teenage abortions,
illegitimate children as wards of the state, sexual abuse of young females, and educational
opportunities for teenage mothers. Id. at 470-71 nn. 3-6; id. at 479 nn. 7-10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
76. Id. at 471.
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id.
79. Id. "In our system of justice, offenders are not deemed less culpable merely because
they may suffer additional punishment from sources outside the legal system." MichaelM..,
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In considering the comparative efficacy of a gender-neutral
statute, the Court pointed out that the relevant inquiry "is not
whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but
whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is within con-
stitutional limitations." 80 In addition, the Court found that enforce-
ment problems would exist under a gender-neutral statute; the
female would be less likely to report a violation if she would be
subject to prosecution.8" The Court found that the equal protection
clause does not require a legislature to enact a statute so broad that
it may be impossible to enforce.8 2
In a dissenting opinion8 3 Justice Brennan said the plurality
placed too much emphasis on the state's statutory goal and not
enough emphasis on whether the statute is substantially related to
the achievement of that goal.84 Justice Brennan found that Califor-
nia had not met its burden of proving that a gender-specific statute
is substantially related to a decrease in teenage pregnancies or that a
gender-neutral statute would be less effective.8 5 To meet this bur-
den, the dissent would have the state show that its statutory rape
law-because it punishes only males-"more effectively deters mi-
nor females from having sexual intercourse. '"86
Justice Brennan found two serious flaws in the majority's con-
cern about enforcement problems with a gender-neutral statute.87
The first flaw was a lack of proof.88 At least thirty-nine states have
gender-neutral statutory rape laws,89 and California introduced no
evidence that those states have been handicapped by enforcement
problems.90 The second flaw was that the state must still show that
those enforcement problems would make a gender-neutral statute
25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601 P.2d at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "In my
judgment, the fact that a class of persons is especially vulnerable to a risk that a statute is
designed to avoid is a reason for making the statute applicable to that class. . . . I regard a
total exemption for the members of the more endangered class as utterly irrational."
Michael M, 450 U.S. at 499-500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. 450 U.S. at 473.
81. Id. at 473-74.
82. Id. at 474.
83. Joined by Justices White and Marshall.
84. 450 U.S. at 488-89.
85. Id. at 489 n.2.
86. Id. at 491.
87. Id. at 492.
88. Id. at 492-93.
89. See supra note 68.
90. 450 U.S. at 492-93.
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less effective. 91 He argued that a gender-neutral law would be a
greater deterrent because it would affect twice as many potential
violators.92
Justice Brennan also questioned whether the actual purpose of
California's statutory rape law was to protect young women from
the risk of pregnancy.93 History shows that the law initially rested
on the assumption that young women were legally incapable of con-
senting to an act of sexual intercourse. 94 The dissent suggested that
this change in purpose may be why the state was not able to demon-
strate the required substantial relationship. 95
Now that the United States Supreme Court has stated its posi-
tion and upheld California's law, the federal court trend of finding
gender-specific statutory rape laws unconstitutional 96 will likely be
reversed.
It is unfortunate that in rendering a significant decision like
Michael M the Court failed to provide clear guidelines for lower
courts to follow when deciding gender-based discrimination suits.
While prevention of teenage pregnancies may be a legitimate state
interest,97 the state did not meet the burden of proof required under
the middle-tier level of scrutiny. 98 In fact, Justice Rehnquist seems
to alter the test by requiring only a sufficient relationship between
the classification and the state's objective. 99 This word substitution,
91. Id. at 493.
92. Id. at 494.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 496. An interesting account of the oral arguments before the United States
Supreme Court in Michael M is reported in The American Lawyer, Jan. 1981, at 38, col. 1.
96. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
97. Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual activity
regardless of what the New York Legislature does; and further, that the incidence
of venereal disease and premarital pregnancy is affected by the availability or un-
availability of contraceptives. Although young persons theoretically may avoid
those harms by practicing total abstention, inevitably many will not.
Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. What the Court does offer is a variety of statistical evidence. See 450 U.S. at 470-71
nn. 3-6; 25 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 601 P.2d at 574-75, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43.
The United States Supreme Court "has viewed with suspicion attempts to prove legisla-
tive intent through the simple production of statistics." Comment, supra note 28, at 225. In
Craig, the Court said "proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies
the Equal Protection Clause." 429 U.S. at 204.
99. If the Michael M test is intended to actually replace the Craig test, the middle-tier
standard would appear to be considerably weakened. It is ironic that Justice Rehnquist
apparently used the Craig test as the basis for his analysis, since he wrote a dissenting opin-
ion in Craig in which he specifically objected to the formation of a new test and claimed that
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coupled with Justice Rehnquist's failure to clearly articulate a new
standard, leaves the applicability of the Craig test in doubt.
Whether the Court is requiring a substantial or a sufficient relation-
ship, no evidence was offered that shows how a gender-specific stat-
utory rape law prevents teenage pregnancies. 1'0 Conversely, no
reason was given why a gender-neutral law would fail to achieve the
same objective. °" The Court merely offered speculation about en-
forcement difficulties that might arise under a neutral law.10 2 With
thirty-nine states currently operating under gender neutral laws, 10 3 a
wealth of data should be available that would prove or disprove that
allegation. 1o4
The equal protection danger of a gender-specific law is pointed
out in the commentary after Arkansas' rape provision. 10 5  An ac-
the majority pulled the test out of "thin air." 429 U.S. at 220. He also expressed the fear
that the test would "invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices masquerading as
judgments." Id. at 221. While Justice Rehnquist refers to the Craig test in his opinion in
Michael M, he neither expressly adopts nor rejects the test.
100. In fact the Court said, "Where such differing speculations as to the effect of a statute
are plausible, we think it appropriate to defer to the decision of the California Supreme
Court, 'armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the
passage and potential impact of [the statute], and familiar with the milieu in which that
provision would operate.... .450 U.S. at 474 n.10 (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 378-79 (1967)).
101. Gender-neutral laws were discussed by the Court because the petitioner contended
that California's statute was impermissibly under-inclusive and should therefore be broad-
ened. The Court responded by saying, "[T]he relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the
statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen by the Cali-
fornia Legislators is within constitutional limitations." 450 U.S. at 473 (quoting Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974)). The discussion of gender-neutral alternatives is also
a product of the different tests applied in Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Brennan's opinions.
450 U.S. at 494. Under Justice Rehnquist's "sufficiency" test, the state arguably need not
include evidence of the effectiveness of a gender-neutral statute to meet its burden of prov-
ing a sufficient relationship. However, in Justice Brennan's Craig-type substantial relation-
ship test, part of the state's burden seems to be proof that a gender-neutral statute would be
less effective than California's gender-specific statute.
102. The Court said that a female would be less likely to report a violation if she would
be subject to criminal prosecution. 450 U.S. at 473-74. However, as Judge Mosk of the
California Supreme Court pointed out, "The testimony of the female participant is not, as
the majority assume, the sole evidence of the offense in every case." 25 Cal. 3d at 622, 601
P.2d 572 at 581, 159 Cal. Rptr. 340 at 349 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
103. See supra note 68.
104. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that California introduced no evidence
that states with gender-neutral laws have been handicapped by the enforcement problems
the plurality found so persuasive. 450 U.S. at 492-93 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1803 (1) (1977) provides:
(1) A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
activity with another person;
(a) by forcible compulsion; or
(b) who is incapable of consent because he is physically helpless; or
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knowledgement of equal protection problems inherent in a gender-
based law is further demonstrated by the actions of state legislatures
whose laws have been challenged on that basis. After such litiga-
tion, several state legislatures revised their statutes to make them
gender-neutral. 16
If the true purpose of the statute is to prevent teenage
pregnancies-and there is considerable doubt about that proposi-
tion' 07-- then the logical approach would be to hold both parties re-
sponsible. Since absence of consent is not an element of the crime
(c) who is less than eleven (11) years old.
The commentary following the statute provides:
As earlier defined, rape was an offense committed by a male against a female.
The Code section contains no reference to the sex of either the offender or the
victim. A neuter definition is essential since incorporation of deviate sexual activ-
ity into the offense of rape means that a male could be the victim or a female, the
perpetrator, of a rape. Though reversal of the traditional roles is unlikely in the
context of forcible sexual intercourse, the commission deemed it prudent to avoid
any possibility of equal protection problems.
106. For example, after Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1980), which struck
down Iowa's former gender-based statute, IOWA CODE ANN. § 698.1 (West 1946), the Iowa
legislature enacted a gender-neutral statute, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.3, .4 (West 1979); after
Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1979), which upheld Maine's former gender-based
statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3151 (1964), the Maine legislature enacted a gender-
neutral statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 252(l)(A) (1981); after Meloon v.
Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978), which struck down
New Hampshire's former gender-based statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632.1(I)(c) (1971),
the New Hampshire legislature enacted a gender-neutral statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632-A:2(XI) (Supp. 1981).
In the California Supreme Court opinion, the majority pointed out that the legislature
could adopt a gender-neutral statute.
"However, the legislature is not constitutionally compelled to do so, and thus far
for reasons satisfying to itself has not done so. Furthermore we note than in all of
those states which assertedly have adopted a neutral rule, the change was effected
in every instance by legislative action. Not a single state has adopted such a rule by
judicial decree."
25 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 601 P.2d at 576, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (emphasis in original).
The dissent countered that statement by accusing the majority of ignoring the signifi-
cance of the fact that the reform has taken place. Id. at 623, 601 P.2d at 582, 159 Cal. Rptr.
at 350.
107. Even the majority expressed doubt about the legislative intent behind the statute.
rThe individual legislators may have voted for the statute for a variety of reasons.
Some legislators may have been concerned about preventing teenage pregnancies,
others about protecting young females from physical injury or from the loss of
chastity and still others about promoting various religious and moral attitudes to-
wards premarital sex.
450 U.S. at 470.
The Court contends however that the question to be considered is whether the legisla-
tion violates the equal protection clause, not whether its supporters may have endorsed it for
reasons no longer generally accepted. Id. at 472 n.7.
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and statutory rape is not a forcible act, 0 8 it does not matter who is
the aggressor and who is the innocent party. A law punishing sexual
intercourse at a certain age should apply equally to the two parties
who break that law, regardless of gender. 1°9
The Court's decision in Michael M will probably not be a
strong precedent since the decision is based on a plurality opinion,
and one of the justices comprising the plurality, Justice Potter Stew-
art, has since retired." He was replaced by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor."' Although Justice O'Connor's position on the subject
is not known, it can be speculated that based on her previous ac-
tions,"l2 she will not join the voting bloc formerly occupied by Jus-
tice Stewart.1 3 Without her support, the Michael M plurality could
shift, resulting in a different ruling on the discrimination inherent in
gender-specific statutes.
Lynn Wintory Wilhite
108. See Comment, supra note 24, at 757.
109. Legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). Justice Stevens addressed this issue
when he said, "I would have no doubt about the validity of a state law prohibiting all un-
married teenagers from engaging in sexual intercourse. . . It cannot be true that the validity
of a total ban is an adequate justification for a selective prohibition. 450 U.S. at 497
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Justice Potter Stewart announced his retirement on July 3, 1981.
111. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor took office Sept. 25, 1981.
112. In 1970 Justice O'Connor voted for a bill that would have legalized abortions in
Arizona. In 1974 she voted in the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Republican Caucus
against a resolution calling on Congress to amend the Constitution and outlaw abortions.
Also in 1974, Justice O'Connor voted against a state bill to ban abortions. For these actions,
Justice O'Connor has been criticized by fundamentalist groups who fear she will become a
liberal voice on the Supreme Court bench. TIME, July 20, 1981, at 8.
113. In equal protection cases, Justice Stewart frequently joined Justices Rehnquist and
Chief Justice Burger to vote to uphold gender-specific statutes. A separate bloc, consisting
of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, usually voted to strike down the gender-specific
statutes. The swing group in the decisions usually consisted of Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens. For an interesting discussion of voting alliances on the Supreme Court, see
Weidner, supra note 10, at 909-16.

